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The practice of the construction and articulation of knowledge according to principles that 
allow for universal comprehension and progressive appraisal has established itself as one of 
the self-distinguishing features of ‘the Sciences’. An insistence on adherence to this 
methodological practice in the Humanities has been dubbed scientism.  This article highlights 
how at the fulcrum of the intellectual mission of Paulin Jidenu Hountondji has been a concern 
for the equipment of the practices of knowledge production and transmission in Africa with 
scientific rigor that could render knowledge about Africa into an efficacious instrument for 
existential, epistemic and political self-authentication. Against the prevalent trend that has 
reductively cast Hountondji as an African philosopher whose name is singularly coterminous 
with a critique of African Philosophy as being an ethno-philosophy, I demonstrate that at the 
core of his intellectual praxis is an emancipatory quest for the instrumentalization of all 
academic knowledge in Africa - and not only philosophy - into an epistemically sovereign 
scientia on the ever-changing Africa. His ardent fidelity to the philosophies of Edmund Husserl 
and Louis Althusser and the consequences of his utilization of their scientificity motif in the 
formulation of his philopraxis is here elucidated and critically assessed.  
 




[The author acknowledges with gratitude the useful suggestions of the anonymous referees and the 
value of their critique in the evolution of this paper]  
1. Introduction 
Beninois philosopher Paulin Jidenu Hountondji (1942 -) is caricatured as the enfant terrible of 
modern philosophy not only for his characterization of certain expressions of African 
Philosophy as being akin to ethnology but principally for his postulations on the relationship 
between science and philosophy (Hallen 2001, 68-71; Dübgen and Skupien 2019, 47-54). One 
of his early critics, Olabiyi Yai, cryptically dismissed his oeuvre as ‘elitism, philosophism, and 
scientism’ (Yai 1977, 16).  Hountondji’s name is coterminous with the controversy that 
followed his critique of what emerged as academic philosophy in Africa in the period following 
the Second World War, classifying this into what he dismissively called ‘ethno-philosophy’ 
(Hountondji 1996, 34; Masolo 2010)1. Against this background, this paper draws attention to 
the fact the very genesis of Hountondji’s deciphering of the manifestation of some African 
Philosophy as an ethno-philosophy emanated from his systematic conception of science and its 
role, not only in the methodology of philosophy but as a protocol for the critical systematization 
and correlation of knowledge with the social material conditions it interacts with. His quest and 
defense of a claim of the efficacy of science in philosophy, I further argue, are only incidental 
to philosophy; they are essential to his conception of knowledge and its role in society 
generally, which in this instance pertains to the socio-political condition of postcolonial Africa.  
 Presently a latent controversy is taking shape within the historiography of African 
Philosophy concerning the contribution and place of Hountondji’s work within this history. 
There are intimations of the “Later Hountondji” who has reviewed some of his original 
postulations on what he had perceived as theoretical defects in the epistemological ontology of 
what went by the name ‘African Philosophy’2. Refuting this “Later pro-ethno-philosophy 
Hountondji” thesis, I aim to demonstrate that his fidelity to his nuanced appropriation of 
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science is so constitutively inherent to his philosophical project and life-praxis that it can only 
intractably persist into a phase that some would hypothesize as the Matured Hountondji. In 
defence of my argument, I will have to elaborate on a critical aspect of Hountondji’s intellectual 
biography. This elucidates the implications of the profound influence that Edmund Husserl 
(1859-1938) and Louis Althusser (1918 -1990) have had in his intellectual formation, whilst 
showing how he endeavored to contextualized the philosophical commitments of these 
European philosophers into a mission for Africa’s intellectual sovereignty and political 
liberation. 
 In March 2020 Hountondji presented a keynote paper at the historic International 
Colloquium on African Phenomenology, held in Cintsha, South Africa. The title of his paper 
was ‘Philosophy and Worldviews: Why Husserl in Africa?’ [Hereinafter ‘the Cintsha Paper’]. 
This paper, I posit, serves as a summation of Hountondji’s latest views on critical aspects of 
his thought. In the opening statement of the paper, he declared: ‘I have no problem 
acknowledging that my critique of ethno-philosophy was based among other demands on the 
idea of philosophy defended by Husserl especially in his Philosophy as Rigorous Science’ 
(Hountondji 2020). This statement follows his featuring of a quotation from this 1911 article 
by Husserl as the epigraph to his paper: 
The highest interests of human culture demand the elaboration of a rigorously 
scientific philosophy, therefore …if a philosophical revolution is to prove itself 
in our time, it must always be animated by the intention to found philosophy 
anew in the sense of rigorous science. 
 
Hountondji has chronicled his intellectual autobiography in a richly textured philosophical 
engagement of his critics in which he extensively testifies to the relationship between his 
fascination with Husserl’s work and his own intellectual self-discovery, Combats pour le sens: 
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Un itinéraire africain (1997), which is published in English as The Struggle for Meaning: 
Reflections on Philosophy, Culture and Democracy in Africa ([1997]2002a). The text is  an 
edited version of a dissertation he presented and defended in 1995 for the Docteur d'Etat ès 
Lettres et Sciences humaines by research and publication at the Université Chiekh Anta Diop 
in Dakar under the guidance of Senegalese philosopher Souleymane Bachir Diagne. This was 
his second doctoral degree following his1970 University of Paris doctorate earned with the 
thesis  (in translation)  ‘The Idea of Science in Husserl’s Prolegomena to Pure Logic and the 
First Logical Investigation’. The Dakar doctorate was effectively a subjection to a systematic 
evaluation by his African collegiate of his already widely-published disputations arising from 
the motif of his European doctorate.  Instructively, the title of the dissertation for this is 
‘Challenges of a Critique: Philosophy, Anthropology of Knowledge and Politics in Africa’3. 
 Á propos Althusser, I will account for a facet of Hountondji’s critique of African 
philosophy as ethno-philosophy that is often overlooked, namely, his application of a Marxian-
Althusserian proposition that holds that if an intellectual analysis is not ‘scientific’, that is, 
socially-critical, it is ipso facto an ideology that perpetuates a deleterious socio-political status 
quo. Hountondji’s launch into a critique of ethno-philosophy, I aim to underscore, was inspired 
by a disappointment that African philosophy was not emerging as a theoretical tool for the 
emancipation and renaissance of postcolonial Africa. Therefore, in the course of this distillation 
of his appreciation of scientificity and its contextualization to the vagaries of knowledge 
production in Africa, I note and highlight that his contribution to epistemic decolonization has 
unduly been overshadowed by how the ethno-philosophy debate has been conducted as an 
exercise in saving the academic standing of African Philosophy as a discipline among world 
philosophies (see Osha 2005; Hallen 2001, 68-71). 
 Beyond the African context (see Dübgen and Skupien 2019), according to his neo-
Husserlian and neo-Althusserian lenses Philosophy, in general, appears to Hountondji as laden 
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with an inherent methodological susceptibility to unscientific ‘ideological’ decomposition.  He 
would demand that philosophy ‘be episteme instead of doxa, science rather than opinion’ 
(Hountondji 1996, 7).  In Husserlian terms, he strove to point out that Philosophy is best 
conceived as a Wissenschaftslehre, a ‘science of sciences’, that is, a rigorous clarification of 
what essentially belongs to systematic knowledge qua scientificity (Moran 2000, 60). 
Hountondji interpreted this as a Husserlian quest for ‘a theory of science necessarily called 
upon by the very movement of science as realization, or at least the condition of realization of 
this need for integral intelligibility that permeates science’ (Hountondji 2002a, 31).  Applying 
this standard to an African Philosophy that was emerging as analytic extrapolations of 
collectivist meaning from indigenous linguistic forms manifested as his ringing injunction that 
‘scientific rigor should prevent us from arbitrarily projecting a philosophical discourse on to 
products of language which expressly offer themselves as something other than philosophy’ 
(1996, 43).  He would later rightly confess: ‘I thus transposed to Africa Husserl’s demand for 
Europe’ (2002a, 141). 
 Going beyond the current global debate on scientism in philosophy (see Mizrahi 2017), 
I recall that, broadly understood as epistemic practice, the word for knowledge in Latin is 
scientia (see Garcia 110). Thinking from this generic connection of science and knowledge as 
further encapsulated with the axiological energy that is latent in  ‘episteme’,  I underscore that 
with his socially-impactful scholarship that uniquely spans across Africa’s postcolonial 
deleterious francophone-anglophone divide, Hountondji’s corpus and praxis are centrally about 
the scientific integrity, epistemic sovereignty, and political axiology of knowledge that is 
produced in Africa in general, and not necessarily in or a Philosophy.  It is about the political 
of knowledge production, dissemination, and consumption in Africa, and on Africa.  
The critical goal of this article, as such, is to re-cast Hountondji as an iconic contributor 
to the current archive on the search for the place of Science in the Africa of the twenty-first 
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century. In the Cintsha Paper referred to above, he informs how before he finally settled on a 
decision for a Ph.D. research on Husserl he had around 1964 registered for a research project 
on the sociology of science with Georges Canguilhem at the Institute of History of Science and 
Technology at Sorbonne. He intimates: 
I wanted to read and analyze all the available literature on the topic since the 
Course on Positive Philosophy and other celebrated works by Auguste Comte. 
The aim was to understand the conditions for the rise of science and technology 
in Africa, the birth or rebirth, development, or new development of scientific 
culture and technological inventiveness both necessary to empower the 
continent beyond the parenthesis of the Slave trade and Colonisation. 
(Hountondji 2020) 
Starting with a cursory biographical portrait that focuses on the formative influences that 
orientated him to the conceptualization of knowledge as science, Hountondji is here re-read as 
a social scientist and an Africanist activist for authentic self-knowledge. The paper presupposes 
familiarity with Hountondji’s work and the wide variety of critical assessments it has been 
subjected to, hence I will not engage those critiques (Yai 1977; Appiah 1992, 85-106; Osha 
2005; Mangena 2014). Notwithstanding, since my focal point is on knowledge as science, I 
will appraise the only one criticism I consider to be directed at Hountondji’s perceived 
‘scientism’, namely, that of the Canadian philosopher, Bruce Janz.  The paper concludes with 
a brief personal assessment of Hountondji’s success in the construction of his scientificity 
framework, my deciphering of an aporetic contradiction in his attempt at simultaneously 
utilizing Husserl and Althusser as a singular theoretical prism. I conclude that the Husserl-
Althusser singularity leads to a problematic eclecticism in the resultant modus operandi of his 




2. Quest for an African authentic scholarship  
 
Hountondji was schooled at École Normale Supérieure in the philosophical works of 
Karl Marx and of Edmund Husserl during the early 1960s by Louis Althusser and Jacque 
Derrida, respectively. His doctoral supervisor was Paul Ricoeur. Thus equipped with a 
thorough consciousness of the ‘modes of existence of the forms of knowledge’ (Hountondji 
2002a, 26) in 1970 he headed for Zaire, the present-day Democratic Republic of Congo, to 
devote himself to the contextualization and application of this illustrious erudition in the 
European postmodern heritage to the African problematic of authentic self-representation. His 
publications instantly propelled him into the role of an inquisitor into the ontology and social 
value of African intellection. In the Struggle for Meaning he narrates how even while a student 
in Paris, he had been an ‘activist to the core’ who aspired for a new discipline that would 
‘contribute, directly or indirectly  . . . to the awareness of African realities and their 
revolutionary appraisal’ (2002a, 96). 
 At the first glance, his immediate irritation appeared to be an African philosophy that 
was mushrooming around the works of Placide Tempels and John Mbiti during that brief 
episode of the post-independence renaissance of African tertiary education in the mid-1960s. 
However, on closer scrutiny, what becomes evident is that his research output had already 
assumed a purposeful trajectory that was directed by a vision of an African thought system as 
a mode of knowing that ought to be self-depended, scientifically confident, and emancipated 
from its genitive entanglement with the research agenda of the colonial metropole. From the 
beginning of his career, he, in his words, championed: 
The creation of an autonomous body of thought  . . . the effort to formulate 
original sets of questions, not out of a search for novelty for its own sake, but 
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out of a concern for authenticity, of a desire to be oneself by freely asking 
questions that one spontaneously asks oneself and by trying to raise them to a 
higher level of formulation, rather than passively accepting the questions that 
others ask themselves or ask from their own preoccupations (see Hountondji 
2002a, 139).  
A serial sample of the titles of his works is illustrative of this thematic direction: ‘Scientific 
Dependence: its nature and the ways to overcome it’ (1986); ‘Knowledge Appropriation in a 
Post-colonial Context’ (2002b); ‘Knowledge for Development’ (2004); ‘Global knowledge: 
imbalances and current tasks’ (2006). In a 2009 journal article ‘Knowledge of Africa, 
Knowledge by Africans’ he underscored the problem statement that framed this research 
agenda with a lamentation that :  
Despite all progress . . . we are still a long way from what should be perceived 
as our final goal: an autonomous, self-reliant process of knowledge production 
that enables us to answer our own questions and meet both the intellectual and 
the material needs of African societies. (Hountondji 2009, 9) 
His writings attest that whilst comfortably adorning the mantle of a philosopher preoccupied 
with developments within African Philosophy, Hountondji established the relevance of his 
work in relation to historic struggles around the plausibility of the rational capacity of an 
African being, the discourse on the decolonization of knowledge and the de-linking of 
academic institutions in Africa from scientific dependency on external geopolitical centers (see 
Dübgen and Skupien 2019, 109-133). It was in recognition of this supra-philosophy profile that 
in 2002, the year The Struggle for Meaning was published, that he was elected Vice President 




Grounded upon his contention that ‘science lies less in the result than in the method’ 
(1996, 73), a key political-theoretical concern of his interventions did not emanate from what 
is being said or written by Africans and about Africa; but by how it is being said and done, and 
whether whoever is saying it is the legitimate party to say it. He explains that his seminal 
African Philosophy, Myth and Reality (hereafter, Myth and Reality)4 ‘[b]ook questions the 
practice, among westerners, of writing learned disquisitions on Bantu philosophy without the 
participation of the Bantu themselves, but all the same, expecting from them in return a noisy 
expression of inflated gratitude.’ (2002a, 139) 
Besides questioning this Euro-supremacist asymmetry in the flow of knowledge into 
and about Africa, he problematized the epistemic ontology of an Africanus modus cogens. 
When an African scholar thinks and writes, is she doing so for her self-actualization or under 
the spell of satisfying an external colonial-master audience? He bifurcated the exogenous 
tendency from the endogenous one that he advocated. With a Marxian-Althusserian eye, he 
condemned the typical outward-oriented research output and thinking as ‘Alienated literature’ 
(1996, 33). In one of his later reflections, he critically observed that ‘We [African researchers] 
tend to investigate subjects which are of interest first and foremost to a Western audience’ 
(2009, 8). And ‘the small minority’ in African communities who understand the foreign 
languages and media we employ ‘knows, however, that they are not the first addressees but 
only, if anything, occasional witnesses of a scientific discourse meant primarily for others’ 
(ibid.). To the shame of Africa’s scholarship: 
Most of our articles are published in journals located outside Africa and are 
meant therefore for a non-African readership. Even when we happen to publish 
in Africa, the fact is that African scholarly journals themselves are read much 
more outside Africa than in Africa. In this sense, our scientific activity is 
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extraverted, i.e. externally oriented, intended to meet the theoretical needs of 
our Western counterparts and answer the questions they pose. (2009, 8) 
The critical observations he made in the article cited in the foregoing quotation (Knowledge for 
Africa, knowledge by Africans: Two perspectives on African Studies, 2009) revisits and reiterates 
what has been regarded as his most controverted contentions. Against the rising tide of 
cosmopolitan sensibilities, in a 1987 essay ‘What Philosophy Can Do,’ he adamantly insisted 
that the naming or prefixing of any scholarly output as ‘African’ must exclusively be reserved 
for works written by Africans, and not ‘European Africanists’ (1987, 7-8). This essay, and 
other related statements, established that his oeuvre did not only resonate but augmented the 
Africanist epistemological revolution that Archie Mafeje had initiated within the discipline of 
Anthropology (Mafeje 1996), and, equivalently,  Ngugi wa Thiong’o had unleashed from the 
platform of Literary Theory (Ngugi 1987). But unlike Mafeje and Ngugi, as a scholar in 
Marxism, from around 1972 Hountondji went further and interpreted his philosophy as 
requiring immersion in the public affairs of his troubled nation, the Republic of Benin. Between 
1991 and 1995 his political activism propelled him into a break from his academic career to 
variously hold government positions of Minister of Culture and Communication and Minister 
of Education. For this service, he is the life-time holder of the national honors of  Grand Croix 
de l’Ordre national du Bénin, and  Commandeur de l’Ordre national de Côte d’Ivoire.  
3. Around and Beyond Ethno-philosophy: Part 1 
 
In 1974 the journal Thought and Practice (Nairobi) published Hountondji’s paper ‘African 
Philosophy, Myth and Reality’ (1974a). In the same year his earlier ‘Le mythe de la philosophie 
spontanée’ (1972) bearing an argument framed along the lines of Althusser’s Philosophy and 
the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists ([1967]1990), was translated and issued in 
English, titled ‘The Myth of Spontaneous Philosophy’ (1974b). The publication of these two 
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papers changed the course of African Philosophy5. In them, Hountondji established a standard 
for the Africanity and the philosophicality of African Philosophy. To borrow a typology from 
Bruce Janz (2010, 120), he installed a framework of discrimination and classification on ‘non-
African philosophy’ and ‘African non-philosophy’. In the Husserlian tradition, he inaugurated 
an epistemological outlook that would dictate that the conditionality of acceptable African 
academic knowledge would be its justifiability on the grounds of universally accepted norms 
of scientific intelligibility, and equally, the quality of its socio-critical relevance as an African 
product.  
 In the 1996 introduction to the second edition of the monumental text that elaborates 
the key themes of his philosophical project Myth and Reality, in the wake of the raging debate 
the book had ignited, Hountondji went on to clarify that his critique of an uncritical celebration 
of African traditional knowledge systems, and the presentation of products of indigenous 
African languages as philosophy, were but a reflex of a much more agonized mental disposition 
and a groundwork for a broader mission.  He put it thus: 
This criticism of ethno-philosophy broadened into a critique of intellectual self-
imprisonment in general, a critique of the scientific and technological relations 
of production on a world scale, and finally, a sociology of knowledge in the 
countries of the periphery, entailing an increasing interest in the anthropology 
of knowledge and issues in the politics of science. (1996, vii)  
He further promised to explain his motivation and to reveal ‘what idea of Africa and her 
destiny, what ambition, what vision of the continent’s future, led me to reject the theoretical 
model of ethno-philosophy as a facile and unacceptable solution’ (1996, viii). He also 
undertook to explain not only ‘the role played by the works of Césaire and Fanon’ to his 
philosophical outlook, but also that of ‘a certain understanding of Marx (highly influenced, it 
is true by Althusser’s approach) and by the militant commitment within the democratic 
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movement in Dahomey [now Benin]’ (p. viii) That task he executed through his guided and 
systematic doctoral reflection under the guidance of Diagne, which eventuated in a 
comprehensive intellectual-autobiographical response to his critics, The Struggle for Meaning 
(2002a).  
The influence on Hountondji’s University of Paris doctoral research on Husserl under 
the tutelage of Derrida and Ricoeur, defended in 1970, together with his admiration of his 
erstwhile teacher, Althusser is intractably ubiquitous throughout his intellectual outlook and 
commitments. Although the subject and context of Husserl and Althusser’s corpus are much 
separated by time, linguistic-nationality, and ideological orientation - the former being a 
German who worked on the structures of individuated experience during the first decade of the 
twentieth century, and the latter was a French philosopher and Communist activist of the 1960s 
– the similarity in an obsession with the methodological sanctity of philosophy relative to 
science, enameled itself into the structure of Hountondji’s thought. He attests in The Struggle 
for Meaning that ‘despite the enormous distance separating the author of  Formal and 
Transcendental Logic [Husserl (1929)1978] from that of For Marx [1965], Althusser’s 
courageous thesis could not find me indifferent, particularly as I was already familiar with 
Husserl’s demands and concerns about science, philosophy and the relationship between them’. 
(2002a, 11) 
Husserl had set out in search of ‘pure’ philosophy, a scientifically cogent way of 
philosophizing akin to what he had observed in the discipline of Mathematics that could 
transcend the authoritarian empiricism which in his view had engulfed European human 
sciences (Husserl [1954]1970, ad passim). Althusser, on the other hand, had campaigned 
against a reading of Marx’s works that treated Marx’s writings as scripture and failed to 
appreciate the ‘epistemological break’ with speculative epistemology that Marx underwent in 
his discovery of the scientific way of thinking about socialism. Pointedly, Althusser identified 
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this theologico-contemplative epistemology which the Young Marx outgrew as typically 
vulnerable to being a purveyor of forms of sociality sink into uncritical acceptance of whatever 
is the status quo, at being essentially an ideology (Althusser 1969, pp.19, 226). Against this 
‘ideological’ epistemological thought practice, Althusser promoted the scientific approach, 
monumentally proclaiming that true Marxism is a Theory, a science of revolution, and not a 
philosophical doctrine nor a political dogma (see Lamola 1991). 
Given this educational background, Hountondji could not stand a practice of African 
Philosophy as ‘the saying of ancestors’ and ‘folk Weltanschauung’, and of philosophers acting 
as ‘praise singers’ of their cultures and inadvertently, as translators for a European audience 
(2002a, 137). There had to be a political teleology and a methodological protocol that would 
grant this discipline a scientific basis; claiming to be philosophy, it had to differentiate itself 
from mere ethnology and religion, and be able to address Africa’s contemporary dilemmas. 
Twenty years after the original publication of Myth and Reality, he still reiterated: 
In my view, African philosophy should not be conceived as an implicit 
worldview unconsciously shared by Africans . . . I could not admit that the first 
duty, let alone the only duty of African philosophers, was to describe or 
reconstruct the worldview of their ancestors or the collective assumptions of 
their communities. I contended therefore that most of these scholars were not 
really doing philosophy but ethno-philosophy: they were writing a special 
chapter of ethnology. (2009, 4) 
 
Principally,  he argued that this ethno-philosophy was demeaning to Africans as it unwittingly 
cohered with, and buttressed the  European colonial racist ideology that Africans could not 
engage in any abstract and rigorous exertion of reason, which in Husserlian terms meant, they 
could not participate in science. ‘I had to fight in two fronts, to assert the possibility of an 
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authentic African philosophy’ Hountondji would remind, ‘both against the champions of ethno-
philosophy, and the ideologues of European superiority, some of whom . . . curiously saw in 
philosophy an exclusively Western mode of thinking. Husserl, unfortunately, was among these, 
and more clearly still Heidegger’ (2002a, 136). Against this low expectation from African 
intellection, he had to contend that ‘African Philosophy, like any other philosophy, cannot 
possibly be a collective worldview. It can exist as a philosophy only in the form of a 
confrontation between the thought of individuals, a discussion, a debate’ (1996, 53). He 
concluded that until this standard is exhibited ‘Our philosophy is yet to come’ (ibid).  
 African philosophy, ‘our philosophy’ would, according to him, be a ‘set of texts, 
specifically the set of texts written by Africans and described as philosophical by their authors 
themselves’ (1996, 33). This statement was specifically directed at a school of thought that had 
argued that African traditional thought practices as primarily expressed orally, are depictions 
of a worldview that is imbued with a veritable philosophic dimension. Kwame Gyekye’s An 
Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan conceptual Scheme ([1987]1995) stood out 
as principal apologia for this tendency6. Even Odera Oruka’s Sage Philosophy: Indigenous 
Thinkers and Modern Debate on African Philosophy (1991) which institutionalized the value 
of sagacious orature, was still found as problematic. Rwanda’s Alexis Kagame’s analysis of 
Kinyarwanda as a demonstration that this indigenous language, like all human language, had 
an inherent philosophical structure in La Philosophie Bantou-Rwandaise de l’être (1956) and 
La Philosophie Bantu Comparée (1976) symbolized the type of philosophical-linguistic studies 
that became the bete noire of Hountondji’s campaign. 
 




Within the focus of our present discussion, as a tendency, the ethnophilosophical practice was 
judged by Hountondji as being plagued with fundamental theoretic deficiencies, which I argue, 
was distilled by his scientific and post-structuralist approach to philosophy. For a start, it is not 
honoring the principle of critical engagement through tangible outputs of research and debate 
as required of a dialectically developing science. Instead, it was premised on a methodological 
presumption of unanimism, that there is a unanimity of thought and opinion which is expressly 
exhibited in the language of any given African community or tribe.  In his perceptive view, 
traditional African mores and lore presented as philosophy lacked ‘structures of argument and 
debate without which science is impossible’ (2002a, 73).  
Observed with his Derridian eye, this ‘myth of primitive unanimity’ that postulates 
theoretical consensus among all members of a ‘primitive community’, was in reality ‘an 
imaginary unanimity to interpret a text which does not exist anywhere and has to be constantly 
reinvented, is a science without an object, a “crazed language” accountable to nothing, a 
discourse that has no referent so that its falsity can never be demonstrated’ (Hountondji 1983, 
60).  His consciousness of scientia combined with the undercurrent of Derrida’s differentiation 
between langage (language) and langue (meaning) that is, the post-structuralist interpretive 
system of signification and textuality (Derrida [1976] 2017), buttressed Hountondji’s aversion 
of the ways in which African mythology was being dogmatized into theoretical frames by 
ethnological philosophy. 
In the 2020 Cintsha conference paper I referred to earlier, he engages in a deliberate 
defensive update of his philosophy. He informs how during a CODESRIA project that 
produced his edited Endogenous Knowledge: Research Trails ([1994] 1997) he gained a better 
acquaintance with the socio-philosophical nature of language. He developed an appreciation of 
how African languages, qua human language, are imbued with a rational structure that 
approximates to what is adumbrated in the scientificity of philosophy, and on how the import 
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of the collective modality of language proves the instant of thought as a representation of a 
collective tradition since language is shared by a community. His elaboration on this broadened 
manifestation of philosophy in the anthology’s editorial ‘Introduction’ (1997, 1-39) gives an 
impression of some concession for the validation of ethno-philosophy.  In this Cintsha paper, 
he squashes this impression. He reaffirms, as the final paragraph of this keynote address, the 
correction he had categorically stated in the interview published in Dübgen and Skupien (2019, 
165-177): 
I maintained however that this broad sense of the word “philosophy” [which 
valorizes the episteme in languages] was inadequate. The new discipline would 
better be called sociology of collective representations. We cannot claim these 
collective beliefs, ideas and ways of thinking to be our philosophy. They should 
be considered instead as an intellectual datum against which we can really start 
philosophizing, the epistemological obstacle which we have to overcome while 
trying to develop a free, critical and responsible thought.  
The second defect he detected was the risk discerned with Althusserian lenses: ethno-
philosophy is an ideology, and obfuscation of social reality. It is an epistemological sublimation 
from the socio-material experiences of African lived-life (1996, 35).  Neither does it offer nor 
critically deal with the evaluation of the discursive tools that would be required to deal with 
contemporary realities of neocolonial Africa. The title of his book said it all: African 
Philosophy could be a mythological mode of thought that is negligent of reality (African 
Philosophy: Myth and Reality).  
 The third and principal element of critique was that ethno-philosophy itself was a 
typical product of these epistemological and political pitfalls. It was an ethnological display for 
the benefit of Western curiosity. Its idiom, set of problematics, and the mental disposition of 
its producers seemed more concerned at facilitating the apprehension of ‘the African way’ by 
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the outside world. They were desperate to prove to the colonizers that Africans have some 
modicum of a ratiocinative capacity, albeit different from the European one. Ethno-philosophy 
was thus an epistemological extraversion par excellence. Whilst seeming to rehabilitate 
indigenous knowledge systems, in reality, it was a negation of the principles of endogenous 
knowledge production and transmission. At the core of endogeneity, for Hountondji, was a 
grasp of authenticity that was not threatened by universality (2002a, 134-138). 
Taken together as a foundational heuristic, these identified theoretic defects of African 
philosophy were beamed onto the general state of knowledge production within the wider 
African academy.  Hountondji explains how, over time, he was influenced by the work of 
Egyptian-French Marxist economist, Samir Amin, on the link of the relations of production 
between the colonial metropoles and their colonies (Dübgen and Skupien 2019, 75). Upon 
Amin’s elaboration of how Africa’s perennial economic dependency on Western markets is 
manufactured, and how there is a political imperative for this connection to be de-linked,  
Hountondji’s perceived an analogous schema of how African knowledge output is extroverted 
towards colonial audiences and therefore needed to de-link from this metropolitan 
epistemological dependency. To countervail this intellectual extraversion, he asserted that 
Africa needs to develop ‘a new geography of intellect and organising . . . a new regional, self-
reliant, autonomous market of concepts’ (in Dübgen and Skupien 2019, 75-76). This self-
dependent generation of contextual questions and endogenous systems of tackling the resultant 
problematique l’Afrique, would thus impose a future-oriented epistemological outlook, a 
constructive discursivity which, a prior, will not be answerable to any external epistemic 
authority.   
Ultimately, therefore, Hountondji was not absolutely entangled in a quarrel about the 
character of African Philosophy per se. Philosophy, in any case, is a discipline whose ideal 
form and task are endlessly debated among philosophers.  His contention was about the manner 
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and purpose of the production of African knowledge: the sources, consumption, and societal 
impact of knowledge generated by African minds. Conceptualized through Husserlian and 
Althusserian prisms, a critique of philosophy offered a leeway for the launch of much broader 
and pertinent questions on Africa, which questions were later crystallised through Amin’s 
theory of extraversion (Amin 1990). In the year 2000 Hountondji published Economie et 
société au Bénin with a preface by Amin. This project elicited that as their outcomes or 
conclusions were directed at the serious goal of the management of the actual affairs of human 
society, the methods of cogitation of knowledge on Africa had to be precise, systematic, and 
clinical. In a nutshell, in the Althusserian sense, they had to be a ‘Theory’ which is robustly 
conscious of the material factors that influence them and thereby be ‘non-ideological’ 
(Althusser 1969, 17-18).  
 
5. Appraisal of Janz’s Critique 
 
Kwame Anthony Appiah observed in the Foreword to The Struggle for Meaning that 
Hountondji ‘is identified in many minds with a sort of eurocentrism’ (Appiah 2002, xi). Indeed, 
in a Zeitgeist of Afrocentrism and ‘decoloniality’, his key postulations on the methodological 
affinities of science and philosophy as derived from European philosophical authorities has 
exposed him to excoriations typified by Ndumiso Dladla’s: ‘a submission to Western Europe’s 
questionable claim to the right to describe and define experience, knowledge, and truth for all 
other human beings in the name of the universality of science’ (Dladla 2016, 65). His views 
also invited expressions of extreme exasperation, as symbolically articulated by Alexis 
Kagame in his response to Hountondji’s strident refutation of his ethnolinguistic philosophy 
with an exclamation that, ‘but Hountondji, he is white’ (in Hountondji 2002a, 165). 
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Among a plethora of reviews of Hountondji’s thought, Dismas Masolo’s Self and 
Community in a Changing World (2010) remains the most elaborate and engaging appraisal of 
Hountondji in the Anglophone African Philosophy literature to date. However, I will focus on 
Bruce Janz (2010) as he specifically reacts to Hountondji’s thesis on the validation of 
knowledge based on the protocols of the scientific method and attitude. The elements of his 
critique are representative of a tendency that misses the uniqueness of Hountondji’s scientism.  
Both Janz’s and Masolo’s critiques are pertinent as they appeared many years after the 
publication of The Struggle for Meaning (2002a) and the second edition of Myth and Reality  
(1996), with each of the new editions bearing new prefaces in which Hountondji had sought to 
clarify and defend the background to his intellectual positions.  Despite this fact, Janz accuses 
Hountondji of ‘imposing linearity and an almost Cartesian foundation on African philosophy’ 
(2010, 122) because of ‘his reliance on a particular, outdated form of science’ (134).  
In the light of the main objective of my disquisition, in my assessment, Janz’s primary 
mistake, which is salient for us, is his failure to receive Hountondji as not only a thinker who 
is preoccupied with philosophy, but with the ‘sciences’ in which philosophy is encompassed. 
Also, he ignored the import of the historico-political vantage point from which Hountondji 
drew inspiration, his commitment to the African cause, and how this directed what he sought 
from science for African philosophy. Fatalistically, Janz allowed his reading of Hountondji to 
be excessively influenced by his nurturing of his own project of ‘philosophy of place’ (Janz 
2009). In pursuit of the latter he, inter alia, averred: ‘Philosophy’s task is not to be the mirror 
of nature (or culture), nor is it to provide a reliable path to knowledge using the model of the 
sciences. It is to produce concepts that are adequate to the places from which their questions 
arise’ (2010, 124). 
First of all, Janz completely misconstrued the meaning of ‘science’ as employed by 
Hountondji. He makes references to a ‘positivistic science’ (Janz 2010, 120) and riles against 
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‘a positivist such as Hountondji’ (132). Janz (and those who typically criticize Hountondji’s 
‘scientism’) misses the fundamental point that ‘la science’ in Hountondji’s French tradition has 
a semiotic range that extends beyond the natural and social sciences7. It is about the 
systematization and epistemic ontology of knowledge; the quality of its procedures to direct 
conceptual clarity (Hountondji 2002a, 11). Even within the context of the French debate about 
science and epistemology,   there are no traces of the influence of the French positivism of 
Auguste Comte in Hountondji’s thought. Neither is there an ascription to a doctrine of the 
linearity of the development of science which views ethno-philosophy as some early stage of 
a hierarchical evolution of philosophy or scientific-philosophies, as Janz charges.  
Contra the linearity charge, Hountondji’s conception of the development of human 
knowledge is Althusserian and is directed by the political urgency of the deleterious state of 
the postcolonial African condition. It is derived from the hypothesis of Hegel’s dialectical logic 
as historico-materialised in Marx as a Theory. This holds that one moment of consensus, whilst 
ipso facto open to critique, is inexorably tested by its dialectical relations with reality as the 
inducer of change.   This perpetual cycle of critique provokes new stages in social conditions, 
debate, and frontiers of research. Hence Hountondji’s insistence that a modicum of a tangible 
discourse (‘texts’ as in Derrida) must be maintained in African philosophy so that this could 
generate and be subject to critical reviews and debates. ‘The existence of texts is, therefore, 
something that cannot be overlooked. Philosophy as a project is a metamorphosis of discourse’ 
Hountondji had insisted (1987, 6). 
Secondly, through Althusser, the philosophy of science employed by Hountondji does 
not even bear reference to Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions which 
postulates a decomposition of successive paradigms, as Janz alleges (Janz 2010, 76). In 
contradistinction, what Hountondji relies on, is the French philosopher of science, Gaston 
Bachelard (b.1884-1962), who informed Althusser’s philosophy. It is about knowledge 
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systems randomly developing through ‘epistemological raptures’ that inaugurate new 
theoretical insights. This lacoupure épistémologue entails not simply the addition of new facts 
on pre-existing knowledge, but the reorganization of the very possibility of knowledge. It 
changes (re-territorializes) the conditions of what is and can be known8. Hountondji found a 
fascinating similarity between this French philosophy of science and Husserl’s endeavor at 
developing a philosophical method that could limit ‘surprises of history . . . and the 
unpredictable development of knowledge’ (2002a, 71).  
Within the context of this philosophy of science, in summation of the foregoing, and in 
diametrical repudiation to Janz’s allegation of linearity, Hountondji stated that the history of 
ideas ‘does not move forward by continuous evolution but by leaps and bounds, by successive 
revolutions, and consequently follows not a linear path but what one might call a dialectical 
one – in other words, that its profile is not continuous but discontinuous’ (1996, 75). Similarly, 
this is how he envisaged not only African Philosophy to evolve, but decolonial knowledge 
systems to emerge in Africa. 
His passionate demand for the scientificity of African philosophical discourse emanated 
from his appreciation of Althusser’s deployment of the same methodological demands in his 
appraisal of a tendency, then in vogue in his times, at imputing humanistic-spiritualist 
interpretations on Marx’s corpus. Althusser contested that instead of being a dogma or an 
ahistorical meditation, Marxism had to be conceived of as a Theory, as, according to his 
assessment, is demonstrated in the ‘scientific’ quality of the Das Kapital, as opposed to Marx’s 
earlier writings that reflect him as being under the spell of the Hegelian theologian-philosopher 
Ludwig Feuerbach (Althusser [1967]1990; Hountondji 2002a, 9; Lamola 2018). 
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Expressly, in the preface to the second edition of Myth and Reality Hountondji 
distanced his project from its misconstrual as advocacy for traditional (‘bourgeois’?) scientism. 
He remonstrated: 
Scientism, strictly speaking, makes science absolute, overestimates its power, 
and restricts itself to scientific data without taking into account the influence of 
the paradigms defining the current state of knowledge or the complex links 
which tie knowledge to the conditions of its production. Nothing of the kind 
takes place in African Philosophy [Myth and Reality]. Instead, the book 
develops a critique of intellectual and scientific dependency. (1996, xiii) 
He also summarily clarifies in The Struggle for Meaning: 
At the level of vocabulary, I expressed this demand [of science in African 
thought] through a particular use of the word ‘science’, employed in its broadest 
sense beyond the traditional opposition between exact and natural sciences, 
human and social sciences. I also used the word ‘theory’ in its Althusserian 
sense, as a generic term to designate the unity of a certain type of philosophy 
and a certain type of science. (2002a, 141) 
 
6. An Alternative Appraisal of Hountondji 
 
Is a scientific philosophy possible, feasible, and desirable? If one takes this convoluted question 
at its face value, in the sense of its first instance as a generalist examination of the 
interrelationship between the scientific method and the nature of philosophizing, the answer 
would be a plunge into the kind of a conundrum similar to what has recently played out in the 
Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective9. But if one approaches this in the second 
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instance from the perspective of Hountondji’s nuanced understanding of science as an 
epistemic norm that is required to catalyze not only philosophy but generic African intellection 
into a socially transformative practice in the sense suggested by Althusser’s postulations, then 
the question becomes an object of a fruitful inquiry.  
 In reference to the first instance, in concert with Husserl, Hountondji admits that a 
scientifically rigorous philosophy that is idealized by Husserl has not been realized, nor has it 
been adequately experimented with yet.  He makes reference to this in the Cintsha paper, and 
to the effect, he again quotes Husserl:  
From its first beginnings, philosophy has claimed to be rigorous science, and in 
fact to be the science that satisfies the highest theoretical needs . . . In no epoch 
of its development philosophy has been able to satisfy the claim to be rigorous 
science. (in Hountondji 2020) 
This admission begs a new question as to what then is the phenomenological reduction with its 
transcendental phenomenology which Husserl is credited to have fathered (Moran 2000, 60-
90). Or did Husserl make this statement made to clear the ground for the justification of the 
phenomenological method, just as Hountondji quotes this as the backdrop against which the 
emergence of a post-ethnophilosophical attitude is propagated? Or does this explain why 
Hountondji has not been able to overtly declare himself as a phenomenologist, and have 
dithered in applying the phenomenological method and themes in his philosophical corpus? Is 
his obsession with unfettered meaning, combat for a thought system that is not cluttered by 
naturalist considerations in pursuit of epistemic-ontic authenticity his performance of an 
African phenomenology? 
 Whereas within the Husserlian orbit the pursuit of a scientific philosophy culminates in 
a cul de sac, the opposite is the case in the Althusserian one. From Althusser there is a 
theoretical resolution; there is a scientific kernel within philosophy, Philosophy does become 
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a Science, it just needs to be turned into its head. In his influential For Marx ([1965] 1969) 
which he published whilst Hountondji was his student, he argued that every revolution in 
philosophy induces a revolution in science, the two are intertwined into a revolutionary cycle. 
The discourse, the word (logos) becomes flesh! This theoretical resolution that would elude 
Husserl, is, of course, monumentalized in Karl Marx’s self-mutation from a philosopher into a 
journalist and ultimately an economist. The Das Kapital (Marx [1857] 1954) is an 
encapsulation of scientific philosophy. Althusser emblematically demonstrated this in his 
exegesis of this ‘Theory’ in his Reading Capital (1967). In the Althusserian interpretation of 
philosophy according to Marx, Philosophy proper is Theory transforming social reality. It is 
philo-praxis. ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways, the point, 
however, is to change it’ as the epiphany the young Marx experienced a decade before the 
appearance of Das Kapital goes (in Marx & Engels [1845] 1968, 30). 
 
 In seeking to think and work simultaneously as a Husserlian and an Althusserian 
Hountondji entrapped himself into a gridlock. Whilst the framework of ‘science’ as a 
methodological practice instead of a particularised discipline is a dominant theme in both, there 
is an enormous qualitative difference in the philosophical and life practices of Husserl and that 
of Althusser. Their understanding and purposes for which they quested for the scientific 
stability of cogitated experience are miles apart. Husserl was quintessentially an academic who 
was molded by the allure of the abstractness and clarity of Mathematics and his objections 
against psychologism.  His philosophical project was the pursuit of the purity and lucidity of 
subjective experience. Althusser, on other hand, was first and foremost a Marxian intellectual 
and member of the French Communist Party who happened to be an academic. Philosophy to 
him, was ‘class struggle at the realm of Theory’ (Althusser 1990, 210). He was a social theorist 
with philosophical insights which were, a priori, deployed to political ends. Hountondji has 
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endeavored to assimilate this Husserlian phenomenological tradition and Althusserian-
Marxism into a singular theoretical prism. The challenge he would face reared itself from even 
his days as Althusser’s student:  
From Husserl to Althusser there is a huge distance. The ‘cayman’ of Rue d’Ulm 
never quoted Husserl as far as I remember. Being however a careful reader of 
both and a listener of the latter I could not help being impressed by their common 
demand of rigor and certainty, their rejection of what the former calls 
Weltanschauung (Worldview) as opposed to Philosophy and the latter Ideology 
as opposed to Theory and Science. (Hountondji 2020) 
The result of this assimilation gives his grand argument an eclectic set of premises. At certain 
points and instances, an Althusserian proposition is used as a hermeneutic device, whilst at the 
subsequent moment, a Husserlian one would be deployed. This results in an eclectic system 
that tends to deliver a discordant philosophical project that easily confuses those who are not 
able to readily filter and merge the underlying influences that frame his positions. 
 For example, a Husserlian fidelity to the model of philosophy as an intellectual practice 
that subsists as conceived in the European academy, the need for a professional African 
Philosophy, led him to devote much of his energy in seeking to cure what he perceived through 
Husserlian lenses to be a fatal disease in this emergent intellectual movement. On the other 
hand, as an Althusserian, he could not care less about the constraining boundaries of 
Philosophy; he could operate with a vision of a scientia that is transdisciplinary and politically 
teleological. His mantra that our ‘our philosophy is yet to come’ (1996, 53) signifies a discord: 
because in Marxian-Althusserian terms, no Philosophy as revered by Husserl is coming; what 





In the end, we can thus conclude that Hountondji was not primarily looking for a new 
‘paradigm’ of doing philosophy in Africa, qua Philosophy. With his notion of endogeneity and 
cautions against extraversion (‘scientific dependency’), he was, on the contrary, proposing a 
new mental disposition concerning knowledge. He demanded that ‘we [Africans] must relearn 
how to think’ (2002b, 53). Learn to think how to engage and change our own conditions. He 
would from thence only add that ‘African philosophy, like African science or African culture 
in general, is before us, not behind us, and must be created today by decisive action’ (ibid). 
First and foremost, he advocates the reclamation of an epistemological agency by Africans, 
which should be accompanied by the qualitative change on the conditions of knowing. The 
terrain of intellection is being reconfigured into ‘a new geography of the intellect . . . a new 
regional, self-reliant, autonomous market of concepts’ (in Dübgen and Skupien 2019, 75).  
The mode of knowing ‘in Africa’ is being reframed into a critical-creative and future-
creating sovereign enterprise of Africans, as opposed to being an uncritical discourse of 
historically static ‘African tradition’ which in its self-alienation serves the enlightenment of the 
gazing world. In his own words, Hountondji promotes a tradition of thought that is ‘living, 
uncomplacent and self-questioning’ and thus authentically attuned to its socio-historical 
conditions (2009, 12). For African Philosophy, this translated into an injunction for the 
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1  In  ‘Four Trends in Africa Philosophy’ H. Odera Oruka (1981 [1978]) suggests that, post-
Hountondji’s critique, African Philosophy manifests itself as: Ethno-philosophy, Sage Philosophy, 
Nationalistic-Political Philosophy and Professional/Academic Philosophy. 
2 A point I have extensively engaged in with the three anonymous referees to earlier versions of this 
paper.  
3  Title of the University Cheikh Anta Diop doctorate: Enjeux d'une critique: philosophie, anthropologie 
des savoirs et politique en Afrique 
4 First published in 1977 as Sur la philosophie africaine: critique de l’ethnophilosophie and English in 
1983 as first edition, and in 1996 as second edition, African Philosophy, Myth and Reality. 
5 Hountondji had in 1970 published in ‘Remarques sur la philosophie africaine contempraine’ 
(Remarks on Contemporary African Philosophy) which became the first chapter of African 
Philosophy, Myth and Reality ([1977]1983, 2nd edition 1996), where it bears the title ‘Alienated 
Literature’. Some original sentiments around ethno-philosophy were proclaimed here, but the 
discussions around these remained trapped within the circle of francophone African philosophical 
community. 
6 Defending his book in the Preface to its second edition, Gyekye argued that ‘It is possible for a 
world-view to be the result of a critical reflection on a people’s experience of the world, and to the 
extent that is so, a Weltanschauung could embody a philosophy’ (Gyekye 1995 [1987]: xix) 
7 In the Foreword to The Struggle for Meaning (Hountondji 1996, xix-xv) Appiah explicates the 
ramifications of the differences in the understanding of ‘science’ within the context of the dissimilar 
Francophone and Anglophone scholarly discourses. 





                                                          
